Specific Performance of Contracts for the Conveyance of Real Estate by Jones, W. R.
Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 22 | Issue 1 Article 13
1933
Specific Performance of Contracts for the
Conveyance of Real Estate
W. R. Jones
University of Kentucky
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Property Law and Real Estate Commons
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits
you.
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal by
an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jones, W. R. (1933) "Specific Performance of Contracts for the Conveyance of Real Estate," Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 22 : Iss. 1 ,
Article 13.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol22/iss1/13
STUDLWT NOns
mere willful infliction of injury is not enough without further proof
of express malice. Therefore, in the absence of property destruction,
though malice may have been proved, the correctness of the decision
of Commonwealth v. Wing is doubtful. Apparently, there Is no prece-
dent for the decision. Certainly, it Is believed that a contra decision
should be rendered today, either under the common law or prevailing
statutes.
MARTHA T. MANNING.
SPEOIFIO PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACTS FOR THE CONVEYANCE or REAL
ESTATE.-"Where a party to a sale of real estate has an adequate legal
remedy for breach of the contract by the other party, a court of equity
will not grant specific enforcement of the contract, unless it be neces-
sary for justice." Cox v. Sharpe, 1 Ky. Opinions, 358 (1866). In, the
case from which the above extract is taken the court refused to grant
specific performance of the contract, upon the ground that the plain-
tiff could be adequately compensated by damages.
The general rule in this country, in regard to contracts for the con-
veyance of real estate may be stated as follows: Wyhere land, or any
estate or interest in land is the subject matter of an agreement, the
jurisdiction of equity to specifically enforce this agreement is undis-
puted. This prevailing rule is well expressed in the case of Belanew-
sky v. Gallaher, 105 N. Y. Supp. 77 (1907). In this case the plaintiff
was seeking specific performance of a contract to convey land, the de-
fendant demurred to the complaint, and urged in support of his de-
murrer that the plaintiff had failed to specifically allege that there
was no adequate remedy at law. The court, in overruling his demurrer
said, "Such an allegation is not necessary in an action to compel spe-
cific performance of a contract to convey real estate. The courts will
specifically enforce such an agreement even when the vendor is finan-
cially responsible and the vendee has an adequate remedy at law for
damages."
The crystallization of this rule is probably due historically to the
peculiar respect and consideration which has been accorded to land
In the English law. Since the latter part of the 15th century, English
courts have consistently granted specific performance of contracts
for the sale of land, usually upon the ground that damages for
breach of the contract are always considered inadequate. The reason
upon which this historic rule is based has been well stated by Judge
Pearson In the case of Kitchen v. Herring, 42 N. C. 191 (1851), in
which he says, "The principle in regard to land was adopted, not be-
cause It was fertile or rich in minerals, or valuable for timber, but
simply because it was land-a favorite and favored subject in England
and every country of Anglo-Saxon origin."
This historic English rule, as regarding the inadequacy of damages
for breach of a contract to convey land, has seemingly been taken over
intact, by the courts of this country. There has, however, been a re-
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cent tendency by the courts of some of the states, to break away from
this rule, in cases where there is obviously an adequate remedy at
law. Probably the most outstanding of these "exceptional cases" is
the case of Hazelton v. Miller, 25 App. D. C. 337 (1905). In this case
the defendant contracted to sell land to the plaintiff for $9,000.00, and
the plaintiff in turn had agreed to sell this same land to the govern-
ment for $14,000.00, the plaintiff asks for specific enforcement of this
contract. The court held that inasmuch as the plaintiff, by his own
showing, has an adequate remedy at law, the court of equity will not
allow specific performance of the contract. Another recent case which
holds parallel to Hazelton v. Miller, supra, is Oklahoma G(as Corp. v.
Municipal Gas Co., 38 F. (2d) 444 (1930). This case states that if the
remedy at law is certain, prompt, complete, and efficient, so as to ob-
tain the ends of justice then this will preclude remedy by specific per-
formance, even it the contract involves real estate. The cases of
Lenoir v. McDaniel, 80 Fla. 500, 86 So. 435 (1920); and Clark v. Flint,
22 Pick. (Mass.) 231, 33 Amer. Dec. 733 (1839), both hold that a party
will be denied relief by specific performance if it is shown that the
party can be adequately compensated by damages.
While the vast majority of cases in this country hold that it is a
"conclusive" presumption of law, that damages do not constitute an
adequate remedy for breach of a contract to convey real estate, it
seems that all the weight of legal logic and reason support those few
cases composing the minority view upon the question. The application
of such a strict doctrine as set out by the majority of the courts, may
be justified in England by the social and economic conditions of that
country. Land in England has always been considered unique, the
scarcity of land available to purchasers rendering such a vier neces-
sary. In this country no like justification for this rule can be found.
As Pomeroy very aptly states it, "Land, is often, In this country,
bought and held simply as merchandise, for mere purposes of pecuni-
ary profit, possessing no other interest in the eyes of the purchaser
and owner other than its market value." Pomeroy, Specific Perform-
ance (3d Ed.) Section 10. To say that land in most of the western
states of this country is unique would be doing a great injustice to
that word. In most cases arising in these states in which a Tendor
falls to perform a contract to convey land, the vendee can, with very
little additional trouble and expense, secure other land which will
fulfill his purpose just as well as that land for which he originally con-
tracted.
Therefore, in these cases we cannot truthfully say that the vendee
cannot be adequately compensated by money damages. Bearing this
fact in mind we might well ask ourselves, why do our courts continue
to follow a rule of stare decisis whose only reason seems to rest In its
antiquity? It is quite probable that Chancellor Kent was referring to
a situation like the one presented here when he made the following
remark: "I do not wish to be understood to press too strongly the rule
of stare decisis. It is probable that the records of the courts of this
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country are replete with hasty and crude decisions; and such cases
ought to be examined without fear, and revised without reluctance,
rather than to have the character of our law impaired, and the beauty
and harmony of our system destroyed by the perpetuity of error." 1
Kent's Comm. 477.
Kentucky seems to line up with the majority of the states upon
the problem of the adequacy of damages for breach of a contract to
convey realty. Mills v. Metcalf, 8 Ky. 477, (1819); Flege v. Coving-
ton & Cincinnati Elevated R. R. and Bridge Co., 122 Ky. 348, 91 S. W.
738 (1906); McGee v. Bell, 3 Littell (13 Ky.) 190 (1823). However,
there are few cases in this state with direct language to this effect;
probably the case which best illustrates the view of the Kentucky
courts Is the case of Mills v. Metcalf, supra. In this case the plaintiff
filed a bill in equity with a double aspect of either gaining specific
execution or cancellation of contract for the sale of 1,600 acres of land.
The court held that although a complainant may maintain an action
at law for a breach of such a contract he may further, if he elects to
do so, resort to equity for specific execution of the contract. In the
principle case, however, it is quite evident that the court has departed
from the beaten path as set out in the majority of the cases, and to the
writer this view seems to be the better one.
In conclusion, it might be said, that in spite of the overwhelming
number of cases bearing out the so-called majority view, it cannot be
said that the status of contracts concerning the sale of land is defi-
nitely settled. Now, more than ever before, the courts of this country
seem to realize that they cannot support this rule, and at the same
time, line up with some of the basic principles of equity. From the
attitude taken by the court in some of the recent cases, it may be
safely predicted, that in the near future the courts will take a less arbi-
trary attitude toward this problem and refuse to grant relief by spe-
cific performance unless the plaintiff affirmatively shows that he has
no adequate relief in a court of law.
W. R. JoiNEs.
CRIMES--CNTEMPT nY PUBLIcATIo .- In a recent case the question
of summary punishment by the court for contempt by publication
again arises. Defendant was the publisher of the San Diego Herald, a
paper printed and circulated in San Diego, Cal. On March 13th, 1930,
this newspaper contained an article captioned as follows: "New
Grand Jury Is Sweet Scented Bunch of Hollyhocks Designed to 'Protect
San Diego'. Judge Andrews Picked Them but Could Have Added
More. (By A. R. Sauer)"; and contained a lengthy article berating
the court and Its officers in the same vein. On March 20th, 1930, Judge
Andrews filed an affidavit for contempt and had the sheriff attach the
body of Sauer and bring him before the court. When the case came
to trial the accused filed an affidavit alleging the disqualification of the
respondent judge and made application to have the case transferred
to another department of the San Diego Superior Court. The applica-
